## 1

Text: The United States federal government should remove the travel ban to gradually remove the embargo

#### Removing the embargo gradually solves – immediate removal causes instability

Zimmerman 10 – CHELSEA A. ZIMMERMAN, Georgetown Law, ’10, “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy,” <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf>, ACC. 6-13-2013)

Elimination of the trade embargo immediately is not a feasible solution, as such a proposal would not attract sufficient political support. Furthermore, the Cuban political and legal infrastructure does not have the capability of adapting to such a radical change. Instead, I recommend incremental measures that would 1) reduce the restrictions on the financing of Cuba’s purchase of U.S. products by allowing payments to be made directly to U.S. banks; and 2) reduce and eventually eliminate the restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba by initially permitting travel for educational and cultural purposes and eventually permitting direct commercial flights from the U.S. to Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission’s analysis of the effects of government restrictions on export financing estimates that the U.S. share of Cuban agricultural, fish and forest product imports would increase between one-half and two-thirds, and that all U.S. agricultural sectors would benefit from the lifting of financing restrictions (U.S. International Trade Commission). The Commission also studied the effect on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba if travel restrictions were eliminated, and concluded that significant increases in U.S. exports of processed foods, poultry, beef and pork and fish would result (U.S. International Trade Commission).

## 2

#### The plan re-inscribes neoliberalism – the alternative is to reject neoliberalism

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Extinction---tech and reforms fail

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

In the midst of the record-breaking heat wave in the summer of 2003, George Monbiot, the renowned columnist for the London Guardian, penned a short but eloquent essay entitled "Sleepwalking to Extinction." Monbiot wrote: We live in a dreamworld. With a small, rational part of our brain, we recognize that our existence is . . . destroying the conditions for human life on earth. Were we governed by reason, we would be on the barricades today, dragging the drivers of Range Rovers and Nissan Patrols out of their seats, occupying and shutting down the coal-burning power stations, bursting in upon the Blairs' retreat from reality in Barbados and demanding a reversal of economic life as dramatic as the one we bore when we went to war with Hitler.1 But despite the frightening trends and increasingly desperate pleas from the world's scientists, the world's corporate and political leadership show no sign of abandoning denial and adopting "reason" nor scrapping business-as-usual to mobilize against catastrophe. The ritual has now become depressingly familiar and predictable: After each new "shocking" report on melting icecaps, the slowing Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic, or eco-devastation in Africa or China, "concerned" politicians call for "immediate action" and "drastic steps" to curb emissions but then do nothing of substance. Successive post-Kyoto talks begin with urgent pleas from devastated Third World peasants and expert scientists, then collapse in disagreement. At every turn, the priority of growth and profits overrides every ringing alarm, and society carries on in its "sleepwalk to extinction." In the latest rehearsal of this charade, the United Nations talks on climate change in Nairobi in November 2006 collapsed with no firm targets adopted and every issue of any seriousness postponed yet again. Then-UN secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decried the assembled ministers as "frighteningly timid," "lacking in leadership" and said they displayed "a failure of political will." One Greenpeace observer remarked that "the glaciers in Greenland are moving faster than the negotiators."2 The Nairobi session came just after Britain's Treasury secretary and former World Bank chief economist, Sir Nicholas Stern, sounded the latest alarm with his own blistering report laying down a challenge to Britain, the U.S., and developing nations like China and India that the planet faces imminent catastrophe unless urgent measures are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions immediately. Stern's warning went beyond restating an apocalyptic vision of hundreds of millions fleeing floods and drought; it struck at the heart of the corporate resistance to environmental measures by demonstrating that the cost of inaction could result in the permanent loss of perhaps 20 percent of global output, while the cost of preventive action right now is as little as 1 to 2 percent of global gross national product (GNP). By illustrating the huge economic cost that inaction will impose on the industrialized economies, Stern's report should have knocked the last leg out from under the "environment versus economy" argument. Reiterating the conclusions of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, Stern warned that just to stabilize CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at between 450 and 500 parts per million, we will have to cut global emissions by 25 percent and wealthy country emissions by 60 percent by 2050. Presenting the findings in London, Prime Minister Tony Blair said the consequences of inaction were "literally disastrous" and warned: This disaster is not set to happen in some science fiction future many years ahead in our lifetime. We can't wait the five years it took to negotiate Kyoto-we simply don't have the time . . . Without radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years, there is compelling evidence to suggest that we might lose the chance to control temperature rises."3 The Stern report came just as the International Energy Agency announced that China, which is commissioning a new coal-fired power plant every five days, will surpass the United States in 2009-nearly a decade ahead of previous predictions-as the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide.4 Largely because of China's growth, the Global Carbon Project reported in the November 13, 2006 issue of Nature that "Global carbon emissions are now growing by 3.2 percent a year... That's four times higher than the average annual growth of 0.8 percent from 1990-1999 . . . We are not on any of the stabilization paths." Professor Bill McGuire, director of the Benfield Hazard Research Center in London, said: "This is more very bad news. We need a 60 to 70 percent cut in emissions, but instead, emission levels are spiraling out of control. The sum total of our meager efforts to cut emissions amounts to less than zero."5 The Necessity of Hypocrisy So what sort of "radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years" do Blair and Stern propose to stop this onrushing catastrophe? None. After all their rhetoric about impending disaster, the best they could do was call for more "carbon pricing," "more research into new technologies," and "robust international agreements." They specifically rejected mandatory limits on emissions as "too inflexible" and-most crucially-have nothing whatsoever to say about the implications of inexorable growth. On the face of it, this was a completely inadequate response to the crisis, and Blair was immediately chastised by his own party for resisting binding targets.6 After all, carbon pricing schemes, notably in the EU, have already proved to be a colossal failure since economic growth has just barreled through the Kyoto carbon "limits." And what possible technical breakthroughs could cut global CO2 emissions by 60 percent, particularly in the ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe Blair says we must act in order to save ourselves, when China is adding a new coal-fired power plant every week and coal-fired plants are still being built in the United States.7 Nearly everywhere, we see that despite the increased energy efficiency and installation of pollution controls in cars or power plants, without limits to growth these gains are outstripped by ever-increasing production. So instead of CO2 emissions falling, globally emissions are actually accelerating.8 And CO2 emissions are only one-and perhaps not the even the worst-of the oncoming ecological catastrophes we face. Around the world, forests are also vanishing, clean water is disappearing, coral reefs are dying off, species after species is being driven to extinction, resource after resource is being exhausted; everywhere the natural world is being systematically plundered and sacrificed to the god of relentless growth, profits and consumption.9 The Inconvenient Truth Al Gore Does Not Want to Face Blair's contradictions are entirely predictable, rational, and necessary from the standpoint of his capitalist perspective, because the problems he faces are systemic, built into the logic of capitalist economics, and thus unsolvable within the framework of capitalism. The solution to the threat of global warming is obvious: The only way to cut emissions by 60 to 70 percent in the next ten to fifteen years-barring some as yet unknown technical miracle-is by drastically cutting production, output and consumption, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Al Gore says we face an "inconvenient truth": consume less, conserve more-or die. The problem is the admonition to consume less has to translate into the reality of consuming less-less oil, electricity, steel, aluminum, wood, paper, plastic, fabric, beef, fish, and so on. That, in turn, can only mean producing fewer cars, airplanes, kitchen remodels, fashions, resort vacations, TVs and TV shows, hamburgers and Starbucks Frappuccinos-i.e., converting less of nature into consumable commodities to give a break to the fish, forests, oceans, atmosphere, and all the other natural resources exploited to support the capitalist consumer lifestyle. This is the really inconvenient truth that no investor, labor union, government, mainstream environmental organization, nor anyone of us-including Al Gore-wants to face.10 But this is the truth we have to face if we want to survive. Despite the difficulty such a massive challenge poses, it does not mean that people have to starve. On the contrary, if we do not make these cuts and restructure the global economy, not only will millions soon die from starvation, floods, drought and other catastrophes, but the capitalist engine of ecodestruction will drive humanity to the brink of collapse, if not extinction. The problem is, given the requirements of capitalist reproduction, particularly the need to meet shareholder demands for growing profits, no corporation can cut production and stay in business. Furthermore, any broad effort to slow production and consumption would only bring on market collapse and economic depression. So, as long as Blair, Stern, Al Gore, and the rest of the corporate and political elite are committed to maintaining and perpetuating global capitalism as their first and foremost priority, they have no choice but to subordinate the environment to growth and consumption, override their own environmental targets, turn themselves into hypocrites, and doom the future of humanity. To imagine, as they do, that technical innovations, carbon taxes, "green shopping" and the like will allow production and consumption to spiral endlessly upward and consume evermore resources while pollution and emissions spiral downward is to live in a delusional dreamworld of faith-based economics that has no empirical basis.11 Through most of human history up to around the 17th century, humanity suffered from class structures that put brakes on productivity growth, institutionalized underproduction as a regular feature of economic life, and so brought on periodic famines and demographic collapse. But since the advent of the capitalist mode of production, humanity has both benefited-but also increasingly suffered-from the opposite problem: crises and consequences of overproduction, which have typically taken the form of economic crashes and depression. Today, this engine of relentless technological revolution and productivity growth has built an economy of such power, capacity and scale that it is systematically destroying the very ecological basis of human life. The Smithian Operating System To understand why the free market can't solve our global environmental crisis, the place to start is with an examination of the logic and contradictions of capitalist economics-the economics of Adam Smith. Needless to say, Smith can't be held responsible for the problems and consequences of capitalist development. But Smith's economic theory is a metonym - the language of capitalism, its intellectual "operating system." For it was Smith, the original and foremost theorist of capitalism, who first discovered and elaborated the organizing principle of capitalist economic life, which he famously termed the "invisible hand." Smith found it remarkable that in what he called "commercial society" (what we today call capitalism), no one looks out for the "general welfare" of society as such. Yet somehow, the provision of the necessities of life-e.g., enough food, clothes, housing, and transportation-so that society can carry on from day-to-day and year-to-year seems to more or less unconsciously get taken care of. In some of the most famous phrases in all of economic literature Smith asserted: In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it grows up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want . . . and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages . . . (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 14.)12 And again that: Every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, p. 423.)13 Smith's insight, one of the most powerful and elegant concepts in the history of capitalist economics, grasps the essence of the market system-namely, production for exchange, specialized division of labor, and mutual dependence of all producers/commodity sellers/consumers upon one another through the market. This is what distinguishes the market system from all previous economic systems, such as communal tribal society, slavery, and feudalism-all of which were, in one way or another, systems based overwhelmingly on direct production for use rather than for exchange. For example, in pre-capitalist economic systems like medieval agrarian Europe, farm production was planned and largely for direct use. The basic unit of rural production was the peasant family with its farm, rudimentary tools and livestock. Peasant farmers not only grew their own food but often made their own clothes, fabricated most of their own tools, and built their own houses. Peasants produced mostly for subsistence and, where they were enserfed, to pay rents to feudal landlords, tithes to the church, and sometimes additional obligations to the state. Beyond this, those who could produce and retain some surplus over subsistence, rent, and tithe obligations sold it in local town markets to procure the few necessities they could not produce for themselves on the farm or in the lord's demesne shops, such as metal for plows or tools. In the villages, patriarchal family households organized the day-to-day operations of farm life, determining which crops to grow and when, and assigning a division of labor within the family. They planned this production based on their foreknowledge of what their family unit needed to carry on from year-to-year-how much and what kinds of crops and animals to raise, and how much labor to devote to farming, husbandry, and building upkeep. More often than not, because village agricultural regimes required village-wide cooperation to regulate seasonal plantings, field rotations, harvest, and commons management, peasant farmers collectively planned and regulated their seasonal work rhythms in cooperation with their neighbors according to the custom and village bylaws in tightknit village communities. Throughout Europe, most rural agrarian output was directly consumed on the farm, in the hamlets and villages. The feudal aristocracy consumed the surpluses directly and marketed some of their surpluses in urban markets to purchase luxury goods and military equipment. In short, rural Europe, at least up to the 15th century, was in a sense a "planned" economy-or more precisely, consisted of masses of miniature planned village economies.14 By Adam Smith's day in the late 18th century, rural peasant village self-sufficiency with its limited division of labor had largely given way to generalized production for market throughout England and parts of Western Europe. In this new "commercial" economy, Smith observed there is no general economic "plan." No one plans production for the self-sufficient family anymore. Production is now specialized and geared for the whole society-and it is to society that one must turn to satisfy one's own needs. No one knows how much wheat or wool, how many shoes, coats, ships, or wagons society needs, or when they are needed. No one consciously divides up and assigns society's labor to the various tasks of producing all that society requires over any given period of time.15 And yet out of the unconscious "mindlessness" of this system, a spontaneous order emerges. Society seems to be "guided by an invisible hand" to produce more or less of these goods so that we can carry on from day-to-day to ensure social reproduction. By the developing 18th-century capitalist economy of Adam Smith's era, most producers no longer possessed their own means of subsistence, or at least full subsistence. Masses of peasant farmers had been cleared off the land and proletarianized by centuries of enclosure movements. Peasant subsistence farms, with all their variety of produce, had been replaced with wheat farms or sheep folds. The hand loom weaver, village blacksmith and most small-scale hand manufacturers were giving way to large-scale factory production with a specialized division of labor and, increasingly in the late 18th century, mechanization. Without full access to the means of subsistence, everyone in capitalist society must specialize to produce a commodity for market or sell their labor power to work for an employer who does possess the means of production.16 So to win one's own bread in the capitalist organization of production, virtually everyone, including the capitalists, must continuously sell their specialized commodity on the market in order to continuously purchase their own means of subsistence and the means of production to re-enter production.17 In this way, all commodity producers/sellers are dependent upon the labor of others.18 How do these specialist commodity producers/sellers know in advance how much of their particular commodity-wheat, cloth, bricks, horseshoes, board feet of lumber, barrels, etc.-society "needs" in any given year or how much they will sell? They don't. Typically they estimate from what they sold the previous year, and hope to sell their product for at least as low a price as others offering the same commodity. Thus, society's "need" for any particular commodity is determined after the fact by the price at which it sells, what Smith called "effectual demand." If demand and prices are high for some particular commodity, Smith says producers will "employ more labor and stock in preparing and bringing it to market." If demand falls, producers will "withdraw a part of their labor or stock from this employment" and redeploy those resources in some other line of production.19 So if the market is glutted with wheat, but wool is in short supply and prices are high, some farmers will turn to raising sheep. If demand is low for ships but high for houses, some carpenters will switch from building ships to building houses. And so on, until the supply and demand come roughly into balance, what economists today call "equilibrium."20 That's the beauty and efficiency of the market system, as mainstream economists never tire of telling us. Engine of Development: Production for Exchange and its Imperatives This mutual dependence of each and every person through the market entrains a number of powerful implications. Foremost among these are the implications that flow from competition in the marketplace. Commodity sellers don't have the freedom to charge what they wish, because they must be able to sell at prices close to the competition if they are to compete. The specific strategies and methods producers must adopt to survive against the competition shape the overall pattern of economic development of capitalism as a system and also distinguish it from every other economic system: Producers must strive to cut the cost of inputs, which means seeking out ever-cheaper sources of raw materials and labor. Producers must continuously increase the efficiency of their units of production by innovating, bringing in more advanced labor-saving machinery to boost productivity, and substituting newer and cheaper raw materials inputs. So unlike the ruling classes of pre-capitalist economies, capitalists are not free to consume their surpluses in conspicuous consumption but must reinvest much of their profits back into productivity-enhancing technologies and skills to develop the forces of production. Competition compels producers to strive to grow by maximizing sales, expanding existing markets, seeking out and creating new markets and commodities-or see them developed by the competition, and thus see their stock value fall as the penalty for complacency. As eloquent as Adam Smith was, no one captured the broader developmental implications of capitalist economics better than Karl Marx. In some of the most prescient phrases in all of economic literature, Marx wrote in his Communist Manifesto: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?21 By comparison, pre-capitalist modes of production contained no such engine of development or drive to "constantly revolutionize" the instruments and relations of production. Technological advance under slavery and feudalism was agonizingly slow, and economic stagnation was the norm. When productivity growth could not keep pace with population growth, economic collapse and famine followed. Even the Stalinist bureaucratic mode of production in Russia and China contained no such built-in drive to development. Post-revolutionary Russia and China rapidly developed and industrialized to a considerable extent, but the bureaucratic system was not powered by any self-active motor. Development depended entirely on the conscious actions and direction of central planners, but for the same reason, it was also severely limited and handicapped by the bureaucracy's inability to push development beyond certain limits. In particular, these bureaucrats lacked the weapons of unemployment and bankruptcy to discipline producers, force productivity increases, or generate innovation and development.22 Without competition to force producers to innovate and become more efficient, top-down bureaucratically driven development was no match for the dynamic growth of global capitalism. This engine of development has brought the most prodigious development of the forces of production of any mode of production in history, lifting the living standards of billions of people the world over. So it was no surprise that since the spectacular collapse of communism and the global triumph of capitalism in the 1990s, Smithian economics has been crowned with a sacred halo, unquestioned and self-evident to the churched.23 Today, Smith's theory, rebranded for today's market under the neoclassical and neoliberal labels, is entrenched in every economics department from Berkeley to Beijing. Engine of Planetary Eco-collapse: The Collective Irrationality of Individualist Economics In his 1996 book The Future of Capitalism, Lester Thurow lucidly captured the socially suicidal aggregate impact of individualistic economic decision-making: Nowhere is capitalism's time horizon problem more acute than in the area of global environmentalism .. . What should a capitalistic society do about long-run environmental problems such as global warming or ozone depletion? . .. Using capitalist decision rules, the answer to what should be done today to prevent such problems is very clear-do nothing. However large the negative effects fifty to one hundred years from now might be, their current discounted net present value is zero. If the current value of the future negative consequences are zero, then nothing should be spent today to prevent those distant problems from emerging. But if the negative effects are very large fifty to one hundred years from now, by then it will be too late to do anything to make the situation any better, since anything done at that time could only improve the situation another fifty to one hundred years into the future. So being good capitalists, those who live in the future, no matter how bad their problems are, will also decide to do nothing. Eventually a generation will arrive which cannot survive in the earth's altered environment, but by then it will be too late for them to do anything to prevent their own extinction. Each generation makes good capitalist decisions, yet the net effect is collective social suicide.24 Lester Thurow, virtually alone among mainstream economists as near as I can tell, has recognized this potentially fatal contradiction of capitalism-even though he is no anti-capitalist and wrote the book from which this excerpt is drawn in the hopes of finding a future for capitalism. Until very recently, the standard economics textbooks ignored the problem of the environment altogether. Even today, the standard Economics 101 textbooks of Baro, Mankiv and other mainstream economists contain almost no mention of environment or ecology.25 This reflects the increasingly rightward drift of the discipline since the 1970s. The American economics profession has long since abandoned the practice of critical scientific thought and seriously considering dissenting views. Today, an almost totalitarian "neoliberal" religious dogma rules the discipline. Keynesianism, social democracy, and Marxism are dismissed as hopelessly antiquated. Ecological economics is considered suspect. And the prudent graduate student is well advised to steer clear of all such interests if he or she wants to find a job.26 As Francis Fukuyama put it some years back, history has reached its penultimate apogee in free market capitalism and liberal democracy. The science of economics, Fukuyama pronounced, was "settled" with Adam Smith's accomplishment. The future would bring no more than "endless technical adjustments;" thus no further theoretical thought is required."27

## 3

#### Engagement isn’t appeasement

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

#### **The AFF is appeasement**

Barros et. al 9 (Andrew, Associate Professor of History at the University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada, Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, 2009, <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/2009%20IS%201930s%20correspondence.pdf>)

Conventional definitions of appeasement generally emphasize the use of concessions to satisfy the adversary’s grievances, reduce tensions, and avoid war for the foreseeable future. We argued that these definitions narrowly equate appeasement with the dominant interpretation of British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and neglect other forms of appeasement. They also fail to distinguish appeasement from other influence strategies involving concessions. These concerns led us to propose an alternative definition of appeasement as “a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions in response to a threat, with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term” (p. 154). We then distinguished three different types of appeasement strategies, based on the goals and expectations of the appeaser: (1) “resolving grievances” to create a lasting peace; (2) “diffusing secondary threats” to focus on a primary threat—by conserving resources, denying the primary adversary an important ally, or perhaps redirecting the hostility of the secondary threat toward the primary threat; and (3) “buying time” to prepare for (and perhaps deter) a possible military confrontation by rearming or securing allies. We used this typology to distinguish our buying-time interpretation of British appeasement policy toward Nazi Germany from a standard resolving grievances interpretation.

#### “Increase” means net increase

Words and Phrases 8(v. 20a, p. 264-265)

Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term “increase,” as used in statute giving the Energy Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or improvement of equipment that results in “increase” of 50 megawatts or more in electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to “net increase” in power plant’s total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25123.

Vote NEG

1. Limits – justifies removing small restrictions on all countries which explodes limits – theyre key to clash

2. Ground – not increasing economic engagement means we don’t have any DA links because they aren’t specific to economic and they don’t increase it

## 4

#### Strikes inevitable even without congressional approval

Miller 9/6

Jake, “Congress struggling with how to vote on Syria attack” [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250\_162-57601727/congress-struggling-with-how-to-vote-on-syria-attack/]

Ultimately, apart from considerations about damaged U.S. credibility, the congressional vote to authorize military action in Syria could be much ado about nothing. The president, backed by his national security team, has insisted he has the right to launch a strike regardless of whether or not Congress approves.¶ It's a message unlikely to push wavering lawmakers to make up their minds any sooner: The vote on Syria could be among the most consequential of their careers, but it could also be entirely inconsequential to the president's ultimate decision.

#### Congressional approval boosts Obama’s cred – an XO would kill it

Luce 9-1 – Washington bureau chief of the Financial Times (Edward, “Barack Obama risks more than just his credibility on Syria”, September 1 of 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c1b8faa-128b-11e3-8336-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dtdrJg26>)

First, the positive side. Mr Obama’s request, which Congress will debate only in the week beginning September 9, has bought him time to push for a diplomatic solution. On Tuesday he travels to St Petersburg for the conference of the Group of 20 leading nations. Last month he turned down an invitation from President Vladimir Putin to hold a bilateral meeting in Moscow after the summit. By postponing strikes for at least 10 days, he opens a window to talk to Mr Putin, the Chinese, the Arab League and other central actors. Hopefully he can prove that diplomacy works with the threat of action. That would be a triumph. But it would be optimistic to suppose Mr Putin and others will take seriously Mr Obama’s threat of strikes before Congress has authorised them. Until then Mr Obama cannot afford to spend too much time out of Washington. Nor can his principals, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, respectively secretaries of state and defence, both of whom will be needed to testify to Congress.¶ Mr Obama is confident he will get the green light from both houses, as George W Bush did for the 2002 bill authorising the Iraq war, and as George HW Bush did – though by a far narrower Senate majority – for the first Iraq war in 1990. No president has been turned down since the War Powers Act passed in 1973 – though few have bothered to ask. Should Mr Obama win his authorisation next week, or the week after, he will emerge stronger at home and abroad. At home, he will have acquired co-ownership with Congress of whatever happens in Syria. At a moment when a large majority of Americans is sceptical of military action, the president’s hope is to make it bipartisan. His political instinct is sound. Abroad, it will strengthen his credibility too. A Yes vote would demonstrate US exceptionalism at its best – burying its political differences to respond to the barbaric gassing of hundreds of innocent foreign children.

#### Obama’s cred solves south china sea conflict

Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.**¶** Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.

#### South China Sea conflicts cause extinction

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

## Transition

#### Lifting the embargo destroys Cuban ag

Gonzalez 3 – Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law (Carmen, “SEASONS OF RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA”, Summer of 2003, book p. 729-33)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external – the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path. Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions. Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time. It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers – as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads – as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans. The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation.

#### Extinction

Ehrlich & Ehrlich 13 – Professor of Biology & Senior Research Scientist in Biology @ Stanford University (Paul R. Ehrlich (President of the Center for Conservation Biology @ Stanford University) & Anne H. Ehrlich, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?,” Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences, Proc. R. Soc. B 2013 280, published online 9 January 2013)//HA

¶ Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse, a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most, cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an ultimate cause [3].¶ But today, for the first time, humanity’s global civilization—the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with collapse by an array of environmental problems. Humankind finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4], facing what the UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating extinction of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity.¶ The human predicament is driven by overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human population size now is above the planet’s long-term carrying capacity is suggested (conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today’s population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization’s life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth’s carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26] ¶ 2. Do current trends portend a collapse?¶ What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear. pg. 1-2

#### The risk of nuclear terrorism is exceedingly low – their authors are all trumpeting inflated threats.

Mueller ‘11

John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. He is the author of Atomic Obsession. “The truth about al Qaeda”. August 5, 2011. CNN’s Global Public Square. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/05/the-truth-about-al-qaeda/

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, many preferred to engage in massive extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way - except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear.

#### Asia won’t transfer nukes- too hard and they don’t have the materials

Kirk and Chick ‘9 Donald Kirk and Kristen Chick, How big a threat is North Korea?, May 28, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0528/p06s01-wosc.html

It is widely believed that a nuclear reactor recently constructed in Syria – and destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in October 2008 – was built with assistance from North Korea. Some also believe that the North is providing a small research reactor to Burma (Myanmar), says Daniel Pinkston, Northeast Asia deputy project director for the International Crisis Group. He says the likelihood of North Korea providing nuclear assistance or devices to nonstate terrorist groups like Al Qaeda is unlikely, due to the difficulties of such a transaction. And if the goal of such a group was a bomb, the design of choice is a uranium bomb, which North Korea has not yet produced, says Mr. Pinkston. "You can't rule it out, but I think it's a low-probability event," Pinkston says. "If you are interested in cash or cooperation, why would you bother with that?"

## Leadership

**No impact to hegemonic decline – their studies are wrong**

**MacDonald, 11** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. **The** central **issue is whether** **prompt retrenchment** **is** **desirable** or probable. Some **pessimists counsel** that **retrenchment is** a **dangerous** policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert **Kagan**, for example, **warns, "A reduction** in defense spending . . . **would unnerve** American **allies and undercut** efforts to gain greater **cooperation**. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert **Kaplan** likewise **argues**, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on **being more of an offshore balancer**. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention **may encourage regional bullies**. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 **These arguments have** **grim implications for** contemporary **international politics**. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, **if the pessimists are correct**, **politicians and interests groups in the U**nited **S**tates **will be** **unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments**. **Perceptions of weakness and** **declining U.S. credibility** **will encourage policymakers to** **hold on to burdensome overseas commitments**, **despite their high costs** in blood and treasure.9 **Policymakers** in Washington **will** **struggle to retire** **from profitless military engagements** and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, **we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists**. To date **there has been** **neither a comprehensive study** **of great power retrenchment** **nor a study that lays out the case** for retrenchment **as a practical or probable policy**. **This article fills these gaps by** **systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers**. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, **we challenge the** retrenchment pessimists' **claim that** **domestic or international constraints** **inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench**. In fact, **when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers**, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, **even over short time spans**. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, **draw down** their military **obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations**. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand**: the rigors of **great power politics compel them** to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face** **powerful incentives to contract their interests in a** **prompt and proportionate manner.** Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are** **less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes**. **Faced with diminishing resources**, **great powers** **moderate their foreign policy ambitions** **and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value**. **Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions** **of critics,** **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. **Great powers** are able to **rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, **retrenchment can be successful**. **States that retrench** **often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers**. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

**Obama’s getting the U.S. out of heg now—the aff props up heg, causing great power conflict and a violent transition to multipolarity**

**Quinn, 11** – Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham (Adam, 7/1/11, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power”, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, Ebsco, KONTOPOULOS)

As for **the administration’s involvement in the ‘Arab Spring’**, and latterly military intervention from the air in Libya, these episodes also **serve better to** **illustrate Obama’s tendency towards restraint and limitation** **than to showcase bold ambition**. Both its record of public statements during the unfolding of the Egyptian ‘revolution’ and inside accounts after the event suggest that **the administration’s strategy was to ride with caution a wave of events largely beyond its own control.** The United States thus edged over a period of days from expressing confidence in Mubarak to seeking a months-long quasi-constitutional transition to eventually facilitating his abrupt defenestration, as events on the ground changed the balance of probabilities as to the ultimate outcome. **In eschewing either rigid public support for Mubarak**, as some regional allies would have preferred, **or early and vocal backing for the protesters**, **Obama was successful** in what was surely the primary objective: **to avoid rendering America’s interests hostage to a gamble on either the success or the failure of the protests**. 91 Given Egypt’s strategic importance, such ‘dithering’, as contemporary critics often termed it, might justifiably be praised as a sensible reluctance to run out ahead of events. 92 **In its approach to Libya, the administration seems similarly to have been guided more by the movement of events on the ground than by any overarching plan**, and to have retained a default instinct of reluctance throughout. 93 The decision to intervene directly with air power was made only after it became clear that anti-Qadhafi rebels were in imminent danger of total defeat in their last redoubt of Benghazi, after which bloody reprisals by the government against disloyal citizens could be expected. In a major presidential address to the American people regarding operations in Libya, a chief priority was to reassure them as to the limits of the operation. The President insisted that his decisions had been ‘consistent with the pledge that I made to the American people at the outset … that America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.’ Once the first wave of bombing was complete, he explained, the United States would retreat to ‘a supporting role’, with the transfer of responsibility to others ensuring that ‘the risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly’. **Although it was right and necessary for the US to intervene**, he said, **there would be** **no question of using American resources** on the ground **to achieve regime change or nation-building**. ‘To be blunt,’ he observed, ‘**we went down that road in Iraq … That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.**’ **His vision of leadership was one whereby** **the US reserved the right to use unilateral military force** to defend ‘our people, our homeland, our allies and our core interests’, **but** **in cases where ‘our safety is not directly threatened**, but our interests and our values are … **the burden of action should not be America’s alone’.** ‘**Real leadership’**, he argued, ‘**creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well**; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.’ 94 On the very same day that Obama outlined his vision for American and western leadership in the defence of liberal values at Westminster in May 2011, he also made remarks at a press conference with Prime Minister David Cameron that underlined the limits of what America would contribute to the campaign in Libya, making it apparent that the high-flown ideals of Westminster Hall would be closely circumscribed in their implementation in practice. 95 It was explications such as these of **the meaning of American ‘leadership’ in the new era** that **inspired the** unfortunate **phrase ‘leading from behind’**. 96 Thus **the chief message emanating from the Libyan intervention was not**, in fact, **broad endorsement of liberal intervention** as a general principle. Rather, one of the clearest signals from the President was that nothing resembling the resourceintensive operation in Iraq (or perhaps, by implication, Afghanistan) could or should ever be attempted again. Captain of a shrinking ship As noted in the opening passages of this article, **the narratives of** **America’s decline and Obama’s restraint** **are** distinct but also **crucially connected**. **Facing this incipient period of decline**, **America’s leaders may walk one of two paths**. **Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and** seek to **finesse it in the smoothest way possible**. **Or it can** **‘rage against the dying of the light’**, **refusing to accept the waning of its primacy**. President **Obama’s approach**, **defined by** **restraint and awareness of limits**, **makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that**, to cite one example, **his predecessor was not**. **He is**, in short, **a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline**. **Those who** vocally **demand** that **the President act more boldly** are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they **implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course**. In doing so **they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline**. 97 **If** **the U**nited **S**tates **can embrace** the spirit of **managed decline**, then **this will** **clear the way for a judicious retrenchment**, **trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power**. As part of such a project, **it can**, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, **use the significant resources still at its disposal to** **smooth the edges of its loss of relative power**, **preserving influence to the maximum extent** possible **through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy**. **The alternative course** **involves the** **initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios** **for which the U**nited **S**tates **increasingly** **lacks the resources** to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; **deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China** in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear, not for the first time, that he is no pacifist, spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’, and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year, even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’, he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things,’ he declared. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. Evidently **this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream,** **either by** **advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength** **as a good in itself or** **by disavowing liberal universalist global visions**, as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly, given the likely political reaction at home, it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. **Nevertheless, this is a president who**, **within the confines of the mainstream,** **embraces caution and restraint** **to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift** in the intellectual framework of American foreign policy-making. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of global power, it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. It may well be, as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe, that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not, on reflection, fill any westerner with glee, whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of **American decline**. It **may be a process that unfolds** **gradually and peacefully,** **resulting in a new order that** **functions with peace and stability** **even in the absence of American primacy**. **Alternatively, it may result in conflict, if the U**nited **S**tates **clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon**, **or continues to be** **drawn into wars with middle powers** or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. **Which outcome occurs** **will** **depend on** more than the **choices** of America alone. But **the likelihood that the U**nited **S**tates **can preserve its** prosperity and **influence** **and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy** **rather than go down thrashing** its limbs about destructively **will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource**—in short, **leaders who can master** the art of **declining politely**. **At present** it seems **it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill**.

**Best data proves unipolar systems are substantially more war-prone than multipolar alternatives**

**Monteiro, 12** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno P., Winter 2012, “Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064, KONTOPOULOS)

**How well**, then, **does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War?** Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. **Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war** **and the** **incidence of war involving great powers**. **In multipolarity,** **18 percent of great power years were spent at war.** **In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent**. **In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war**. **This is** **by far the highest percentage in all three systems**. Furthermore, **during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity**, **the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was**, respectively, **4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18**.2 percent—or **more than four times higher**.47 **These figures provide** **no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful**.48

**That makes nuclear war involving the U.S. inevitable – Only Offshore balancing solves**

**Layne, 06** - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2006, “The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present”, p. 169, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

**Proponents of U.S. hegemony** like to **say that America’s military commit­ments in Eurasia are an insurance policy against the purportedly damaging consequences of a Eurasian great power war by preventing it from happen­ing in the first place or limiting its harmful effects** if it does happen. **This is a dubious analogy, because insurance policies neither prevent, nor limit, damage to policyholders**. Rather, **they compensate the policyholder for dam­age incurred**. **Even on its own terms**, however, **the insurance policy argu­ment is not persuasive**. Both Californians and Floridians know that some types of insurance are either unaffordable or unobtainable at any price. The chances of the “Big One”—a catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault—jolting Los Angeles or San Francisco, or a Force 5 hurricane making a direct hit on Miami, are small. But if either were to happen the conse­quences could be catastrophic, which is why insurance companies don’t want to offer earthquake and hurricane insurance. **Prospective great power wars in Eurasia represent a similar dynamic: the risk of such a war breaking out may be low, but if it does it could be prohibitively expensive for the U**nited **S**tates **to be involved**. **Rather than being instruments of regional pacification**, today **America’s alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance**. For example, a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapons were not involved—would be very costly. **The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia**, of course, **are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strat­egy would extricate the U**nited **S**tates **from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts** by its alliance commitments.

**Offshore Balancing solves US-Chinese relations and war over Taiwan**

**Layne, 08** – Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2008, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony”, Global Trends, KONTOPOULOS) Word Doc

**Washington**, however, **faces** perhaps **a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing**," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influential American scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy; the United States should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes that Washington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power. **The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing per ceptions that this power represents a threat. As an offshore balancer in East Asia, the United States would embrace a new set of policies regarding Sino-American economic relations, political liberalization in China, the defense of Taiwan, and America's strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require the United States to approach economic relations with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the flow of high technology and direct investment from the United States to China. It also would require a shift in current US trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is a de facto American subsidy oj the very economic growth that is fueling China's great power emergence**. **Second, the United States would abandon its efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to transform China domestically; the primary effect of trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame Sino-American relations. An offshore balancing strategy also would require a new US stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue because China is committed to national reunification and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. If us policy fails to prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the conflict because of its current East Asia strategy**. There would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of us intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would constitute aggression and undermine us interests in a stable world order, powerful incentives for intervention would also arise from ideological antipathy toward China, concerns for maintaining us "credibility;" and support for a democratic Taiwan in a conflict with authoritarian China.

**Sino relations solve extinction**

**Fu, 06** – Senior Research Professor of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and former Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Science at Stanford (Zhengyuan, “The Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations”, Transnational and Contemporary Problems, 2006, Lexis Nexis)

I. Introduction In the Twenty-First Century, **China's relations with the U**nited **S**tates **will be its most important foreign relationship. For the U**nited **S**tates**, no other country will have a greater influence on its future global status than China. For the world, the Sino-U.S. relationship in the coming decades will become increasingly significant. A** stable and **cooperative relationship** between the two countries would **be a cornerstone for a more harmonious world; however, the corrosion of this relationship would have tremendously harmful consequences** not only for the two peoples, who account for more than one-fourth of mankind, but **for** the rest of **the world** as well.

**U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace—their data is flawed**

**Preble, 10** – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO (Christopher, 8/3/10, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?”, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>, KONTOPOULOS)

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some **scholars**, however, **questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory** from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. **They advance arguments** **diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus.** **Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power**; **the** international **economy is** complex and **resilient**. **Supply disruptions are** likely to be **temporary**, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. **Islamic extremists are** scary, but **hardly comparable to the** threat posed by a globe-straddling **Soviet Union** armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. **Many factors** **have contributed to the** dramatic **decline in** the number of **wars** between nation-states; **it is** **unrealistic** **to expect** that **a new** **spasm of global conflict** **would erupt if the U**nited **S**tates **were to** modestly **refocus its efforts**, **draw down its military power**, **and call on other countries to play a larger role** in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while **there are** **credible alternatives** **to the U**nited **S**tates **serving in its** current dual **role as world policeman / armed social worker**, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

**There is no plausible scenario for resource wars**

**Victor, 07** – Senior Fellow @ Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Woods Institute for the Environment (David, “What Resource Wars?”, 11/1/2007, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7344601/What-resource-wars-From-Arabia.html)

THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents cause conflict and war? There is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But resource-related conflicts are multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action to stem the dangers is long overdue.In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE wars are actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry--which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.